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ABSTRACT
I present a spatial model of differentiated product markets in which consumers with
heterogeneous tastes rationally improve their attitude towards the product they choose.
Adjustment raises prices if adjustment facility is greater for consumers who initially
prefer a product more (e.g., preferences and corresponding adjustments exhibit the halo
effect). It lowers prices if instead easier adjustment for consumers with weaker initial
preferences causes attitudinal regression to the mean. The theory explains higher
prices in markets to the poor and less educated and so motivates re-examination of
previously proposed solutions to the poor performance of those markets.

Matthew G. Nagler
City College, CUNY
Department of Economics and Business
NAC Room 4/121
160 Convent Avenue
New York, NY 10031
mnagler@ccny.cuny.edu

On rare occasions one does hear of a miraculous case of a married couple falling in love
after marriage, but on close examination it will be found that it is a mere adjustment to
the inevitable.
- Emma Goldman
1. INTRODUCTION
If you are going to do something, you are better off loving it. That is to say,
individual choice is naturally complemented by the individual’s adjustment to the chosen
object. Numerous intuitive examples suggest the commonplace nature of adjustment.
Married couples grow fond of one another over time and more accepting of mutual
differences. A man who has recently purchased a vacation time-share talks frequently
about it to his friends, whereby he becomes more excited about it. A woman who, on
reading an online retailer’s policies, is surprised to learn that in returning an outfit she
will incur a substantial restocking fee, shrugs and decides she is satisfied with it. A
consumer gets more out of his smartphone after a few months, having habituated to the
apps available at his fingertips.
Recent behavioural and neural evidence indicates that something measurable is
occurring in such situations. Across a range of experimental scenarios, individuals have
been shown routinely to undergo a sort of mental re-positioning relative to choices they
have made, changing not only their stated preferences, but also physiological
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manifestations of their hedonic responses.1 The evidence supports a paradigm according
to which choices not only reflect, but also create, preferences. (Ariely and Norton 2008).
In this paper I examine the effects of consumers’ adjustment on the equilibrium in
differentiated product markets. As I shall discuss in detail below, adjustment matters
because it affects prices. But the effects are not necessarily what one would intuitively
expect – namely, that adjustment intensifies preferences and therefore unambiguously
increases prices.
The idea that “tastes change” has been reflected in the recent behavioural
economic literature on reference dependence; and it has long been accepted in the field of
psychology, most notably in connection with the framework of cognitive dissonance. The
former focuses on recognition of the role of the agent’s reference point in his (potentially
variable) interpretation of and response to outcomes (e.g., Koszegi and Rabin 2006). The
latter focuses on situations in which mental discord – typically due to an individual
perceiving a discrepancy between an action he has taken and his preferences, beliefs, or
identity – provides motivation for a change in mental position to justify the action
(Festinger 1957). While the work in both areas has been highly influential, these
literatures do not admit evidence, as in the stories above, that improving one’s “fit” with
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Studies offering evidence of preference change based solely on subject ratings of chosen alternatives
include Lieberman et al. (2001), Kitayama et al. (2004), Sharot et al. (2010), and Wakslak (2012). Studies
that additionally measured changes using functional magnetic resource imaging (fMRI) of subjects’ brains
include Sharot et al. (2009), van Veen et al. (2009), Izuma et al. (2010), Jarcho et al. (2011), Qin et al.
(2011), Kitayama et al. (2013), and Izuma and Adolphs (2013).
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a chosen object might be a routine, perhaps optimizing, part of the consumer’s decision
process.2
In traditional economic theory, the consumer problem is generally conceived as
involving choice under imperfect circumstances, in which options for action do not match
perfectly with individuals’ preferences. Utility losses due to imperfect matching are
routinely reflected in the modeling. For example, in Hotelling’s (1929) spatial model of
differentiated products, consumers experience “transportation costs” when their tastes do
not align perfectly with their chosen alternative. Given the standard assumption that
tastes are fixed, consumers’ acceptance of the costs or losses associated with imperfect
choice (i.e., without adjustment) is posited as optimising behaviour. Rational consumers
assume moreover that they will not adjust to their choices, whence, the standard model
predicts, they make choices accordingly.3 If, in reality, consumers do adjust, then both the
positive and normative implications of the existing models are wrong. Models of
consumer choice, updated to account for adjustment and for how the adjustment process
is influenced by relevant market phenomena, could produce superior predictions of both
behaviour and outcomes.
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Adjustment, as conceived here, has the goal of increasing what Thaler (1985) has termed acquisition
utility – the net value of what one obtains from a decision. In contrast, reducing cognitive dissonance
involves increasing Thaler’s transaction utility – one’s perception of the merits of a decision. Different
goals lead adjustment and dissonance reduction to pursue different strategies: the dissonance-reducing
agent, for example, reduces the utility associated with non-chosen alternatives, whereas an optimising
adjuster need not.
3
In the motivated beliefs literature, agents rationally anticipate that their actions will create corresponding
beliefs, and their choices reflect this realization (Bodner and Prelec 2003; Benabou and Tirole 2004, 2011;
Dal Bo and Tervio 2013). However, none of these papers deals with the possibility that actions might create
preferences.
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The paper introduces rational taste change4 into the context of a Hotelling spatial
model of differentiated product competition. Consumers differ as to their initial tastes for
two competing products. A consumer can, at a cost, adjust to the product he intends to
choose – in essence, “moving closer” to it, and thereby avoiding some of the
transportation cost associated with imperfect taste matching. By incorporating adjustment
as a step in a model of rational choice, the theory allows the induced outcomes to be
subsumed into “final” preferences such that the conventional techniques for analysing
choices, including the axioms of revealed preference, may be applied to them. This
approach avoids many of the complications associated with previous efforts to model
taste change.
Though adjustment implies intensification of preference, surprisingly prices do
not rise unambiguously with increasing intensity of consumer adjustment. The direction
and size of adjustment’s effect on equilibrium market prices depends on how consumers’
facility with adjustment varies based on the strength of their initial product preference.
Adjustment lowers prices if the best opportunities to adjust exist for consumers with
weaker initial preferences – that is, if final attitudes exhibit regression to the mean. It
raises prices when adjustment facility is greater for consumers who initially prefer a
product more – for example, if preferences and corresponding adjustments exhibit the socalled “halo effect.”
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I characterise adjustment as a process that is fully anticipated by the decision maker, entered into
consciously, involves the weighing of costs and benefits, and results in outcomes with respect to which the
decision maker has perfect foresight. I make these characterizations not because there is a preponderance of
evidence supporting them, but because they constitute the simplest assumptions to make about choice
behaviour. Rationality offers thus a benchmark that subsequent approaches may modify, relax, or elaborate
on.
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That different patterns of adjustment facility across consumers imply different
market outcomes has important implications not captured by existing theories of
competition and consumer behaviour. The paper focuses on the particular cases presented
by poor and less educated consumers. Traditional accounts blame high search costs and
sparse retail distribution for the higher prices often found in markets populated by the
poor and less educated. Thus it is typically predicted that entry by low-cost retailers and
technological advances such as the Internet and mobile shopping apps will eventually
resolve inequities. In showing that entrenched patterns of behaviour characterising
disadvantaged consumers are responsible for the high prices they face, the adjustment
model recasts the price differentials problem, motivating reconsideration of the validity
of vaunted solutions and the role for public policy.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 examines the model’s equilibrium. Section 4 focuses on implications of the
theory. Section 5 concludes and discusses opportunities for future research. The
Appendix contains proofs of all lemmas and propositions.

2. A MODEL
Consider two products, indexed 0 and 1, each produced by an independent firm
correspondingly named. The firms are located at opposite ends of a segment of length 1
representing the product space. Following Hotelling’s model (1929), each consumer is
characterised by a location x ∈[ 0,1] , identifying his relative taste for the two products.
Consumers are assumed distributed on this segment according to an arbitrary distribution
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function F with full support and continuous density function f. They buy at most one unit
of a single product. I assume the baseline utility of a consumer at x buying product j to be
given by

Ux = V − pj − t x − j

(1)

where V is the common reservation price for the product, p j is the price of product j, and
t parameterises the utility loss due to j’s not being the consumer’s ideal choice – the
standard “transportation” cost, linear in the consumer’s distance from j.
Suppose that the consumer faces the possibility of adjusting to a product, defined
as in effect relocating on the segment to be closer to it, thereby paying less transportation
cost. The process is quite naturally viewed as an incremental one, involving incremental
investment of costly or aversive effort that pays off with an incremental improvement in
attitude toward the product. Consistent with this incremental view, let us posit an
adjustment marginal cost function associated with product j, g j ( i, x ) > 0 , where i is the
distance from x and closer to j’s position. One may view this function as representing a
set of adjustment curves G j := { g j ( i ) = g j ( i, x ) : x ∈[ 0,1]} characterised by differing
values of x, whereby each curve represents the cost, at each state of attitude improvement
i, of incremental “movement toward” j for the consumer located initially at x. Let us refer
to G

j

as an adjustment map for product j. Figure 1 illustrates an adjustment map for

product 0.
< INSERT FIGURE 1 APPROXIMATELY HERE >
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For clearer analysis of the effects of adjustment, let us write

g j ( i, x,θ ) = g j ( i, x ) + θ , j = 0,1 , where θ ≡ g 0 ( 0, 12 ) > 0 is the initial marginal adjustment
cost with respect to product 0 for a consumer located at x = 12 . θ serves as a benchmark
level of adjustment cost, hence an exogenous shifter of g where

∂g j
= 1 . The effects of
∂θ

θ are symmetric across products and consumers; variations in this variable can cleanly
increase or decrease adjustment intensity. Accordingly, one may think of decreases
(increases) in θ as exogenous “increases (decreases) in adjustment.”5
Adjustment maps observe the following regularity conditions:

Assumption 1 (Continuity of adjustment cost in x and i). g 0 ( i, x ) and g1 ( i, x ) are
defined on [ 0, x ) × [ 0,1] → ! + and [ 0,1− x ) × [ 0,1] → ! + , respectively, and continuous
on their support.

Assumption 2 (Convexity of adjustment curves). gij > 0 and giij > 0 , for j = 0,1 .

Assumption 3 (Preference dominance). For all x ∈[ 0,1] , − ∂g∂ x <
0

∂g 0
∂i

(and

∂g1
∂x

<

∂g1
∂i

).

The last of these specifies in effect that the more preferred a product is initially, the lower
the marginal cost of adjustment at any particular location achieved through accumulated
To keep notation simple, I will generally write g ( i, x ) , suppressing the argument θ , except where
relevant to a particular part of the analysis.
5

j
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adjustment. This “dominance” condition implies that an individual who initially prefers a
product more than another individual finds it less costly to achieve a given attitude
toward that product through adjustment than the other individual. The condition gives
rise to adjustment maps of non-crossing nested contours, similar to well-behaved
indifference maps. It follows that adjustment results in greater achieved attitude the
greater the individual’s initial proximity to a product.
Extending Assumption 2, assume that adjusting to the point where a product is
viewed as ideal is infinitely costly. Thus, while someone might get quite comfortable
with a product at finite cost, one cannot get perfectly comfortable. I adopt this because it
is sensible, does not meaningfully sacrifice generality, and avoids corner cases:

Assumption 4 (Asymptotic adjustment). lim g 0 ( i, x ) = ∞ (and lim g1 ( i, x ) = ∞ ).
i→x

i→1−x

For consumers for whom adjustment is preferred with respect to a given product
relative to leaving one’s attitude fixed, it is possible to define the notion of adjustment
productivity: how much attitude improvement with respect to the product the consumer
will attain, given his preferences, his particular capabilities at adjusting to it, and the
transportation cost (i.e., his opportunity cost of adjusting). Define the set
X j ( t ) := { x : g j ( 0, x ) < t } ; since g j ( 0, x ) , while continuous, is not required to be

monotonic in x, X j ( t ) may contain (compact) gaps. One may then define the implicit

(

)

function i * j ( x,t ) on X j ( t ) × {t > 0} → ! + such that g j i * j ( x,t ) , x = t as consumer x’s
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“adjustment productivity given t.” Note that, for x ∉X j ( t ) , i * j ( x,t ) = 0 . Thus the
adjustment model nests non-adjustment as a sub-case (i.e., X j ( t ) = φ ).
The following lemma advances some useful results that follow from the definition
of adjustment productivity:

Lemma 1. (i) ix*0 < 1 (and ix*1 > −1 ); (ii) it*0 = −iθ*0 = 1 gi0*0 > 0 (and it*1 = −iθ*1 = 1 gi1*1 > 0 ).

Accounting for adjustment, the utility of a consumer at x buying product 0 is
given by
(2)

U 0 = V − p0 − t ⎡⎣ x − i *0 ( x,t ) ⎤⎦ −

i*0 ( x,t )

∫

g 0 ( i, x ) di

0

and, for a consumer at x buying product 1, by
(3)

U1 = V − p1 − t ⎡⎣1− x − i *1 ( x,t ) ⎤⎦ −

i*1( x,t )

∫

g1 ( i, x ) di

0

One can see that utility losses accruing to choosing a non-ideal product equal the sum of
adjustment cost and transportation cost components and are a function of the consumer’s
adjustment productivity. Figure 2 displays these losses graphically as areas under the
adjustment and transportation cost curves.6
< INSERT FIGURE 2 APPROXIMATELY HERE >

6

Note that the setup in (2) and (3) is isomorphic to a traditional Hotelling model with nonlinear
transportation costs. The rationale for layering adjustment into the model explicitly (i.e., by means of the
“adjustment map”) is so that its effects may be seen distinctly.
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Following Bloch and Manceau (1999), but extended to the adjustment case, I
impose what is in effect a restriction on the size of V relative to t and to the rate of change
of g 0 with respect to x:

i
⎧⎪
*0
Assumption 5. ⎨V − t ⎡⎣ x − i ( x ) ⎤⎦ −
⎪⎩

*0

( x)

∫
0

⎫⎪
g 0 ( i, x ) di ⎬ F ( x ) is increasing for all x ∈[ 0,1] .
⎪⎭

The assumption is a sufficient condition for the market to be covered under adjustment:

Lemma 2. Given Assumption 5, the market is covered in equilibrium.

The location xE* of the indifferent consumer under adjustment can be derived by
setting U 0 = U1 . Thus it is defined implicitly by`

Θ ( xE* ,t, p0 , p1 ) ≡ p1 − p0 + t − 2txE* − t ⎡⎣i *1 ( xE* ,t ) − i *0 ( xE* ,t ) ⎤⎦
(4)

( )

i*1 x*E ,t

+

∫
0

g ( i, x ) di −
1

*
E

( )

i*0 x*E ,t

∫

g 0 ( i, xE* ) di = 0

0

( )

Based on this, market shares for the two products are defined by D0 = F xE* and

D1 = 1− F ( xE* ) .
There are two periods. In the first, firms choose prices, taking each other’s prices
as given. In the second, consumers choose products and adjust to the product they
choose; they receive utility, and the firms earn profits. The equilibrium concept used for
evaluating the game is subgame perfect Nash.
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Given demand, profits of the firms are given by

Π 0 = p0 F ( xE* )

(5)

{

}

Π1 = p1 1− F ( xE* )

As a final assumption, I employ a variant on a distributional restriction by Caplin
and Nalebuff (1991), which they showed constitutes a sufficient condition for the
existence of a unique equilibrium in a broad class of games. Bloch and Manceau (1999)
demonstrated the use of the Caplin-Nalebuff assumption in a Hotelling model of product
differentiation with a generic distribution of consumers. The present variant generalises
that assumption to the model involving adjustment by imposing a set of complementary
restrictions on the consumer distribution f and the adjustment functions g j . In the
Appendix, it is demonstrated that the assumption applies to a rather general set of f and g
functional form combinations.

Assumption 6. F (.) is log concave in p0 (and 1− F (.) is log concave in p1 ).

3. EQUILIBRIUM

We focus on firm 0’s problem. Differentiating firm 0’s profit equation in (5) with
respect to price yields
(6)

∂Π 0
∂x *
= F ( xE* ) + p0 f ( xE* ) E
∂ p0
∂ p0
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where ∂xE* ∂ p0 is derived by applying Cramer’s rule to (4),7
∂xE*
∂x *
1
=− E =
<0
*1 *
i ( xE ,t )
i*0 ( x*E ,t )
∂ p0
∂ p1 ⎡
⎤
1
0
dg
dg ⎥
⎢ −2t +
di − ∫
di
*
∫
dxE
dxE* ⎥
⎢
0
0
⎣
⎦

(7)

( )

Using (6), one obtains ( ∂Π 0 ∂ p0 ) p =0 = F xE*
0

p0 =0

> 0 : non-zero demand for

product 0 is guaranteed at p0 = 0 by t > 0 and g j ( i, x ) > 0 . Moreover,

( ∂Π 0

∂ p0 ) p

0 x*E =0

= p0 f ( 0 ) ( ∂xE* ∂ p0 ) < 0 , where p0 x* =0 > 0 . Because, following from
E

( ) f (x )

Assumption 6, − F xE*

*
E

∂ x*E
∂ p0

must be decreasing in p0 , it follows that:

(

Proposition 1. There exists a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in prices p0* , p1*

( ) f (x )

where the prices are given by p0* = − F xE*

*
E

∂ x*E
∂ p0

)

and p1* = ⎡⎣1− F ( xE* ) ⎤⎦ f ( xE* ) ∂∂xpE1 .8
*

In the context of the unique price equilibrium one may draw conclusions about
the effects of adjustment on the price sensitivity of demand and, ultimately, prices.
Consider a case in which adjustment and demand are symmetric across products so that
any influence of adjustment on relative demand is eliminated and we may focus on non-

7

As a notational simplification, I write throughout

dg j
dx*E

j

for

dg j
dx

*

(i, x ) and
*
E

d 2g j
dx*2
E

for

d 2g j
dx 2

(i, x ) , the first
*
E

and second derivatives of g with respect to x evaluated at xE .
8
This represents essentially the extension of Bloch and Manceau’s (1999) Proposition 2 to the adjustment
case.
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( )

sectoral effects. Focusing on product 0, recognizing that D0 = F xE* and using (7), one
obtains
f ( xE* )
∂D0
=
i*1( x*E ,t )
i*0 ( x*E ,t )
∂ p0 ⎡
⎤
1
dg
dg 0 ⎥
⎢ −2t +
∫0 dxE* di − ∫0 dxE* di ⎥
⎢
⎣
⎦

(8)

Differentiation with respect to θ leads to the following result:

Proposition 2. Consider a symmetric case in adjustment. Adjustment increases the price
sensitivity of product demands when consumers’ adjustment facility diminishes with
stronger initial product preference. It decreases the price sensitivity of demands when
consumers’ adjustment facility increases with stronger initial product preference.

Proposition 2 provides our first glimpse into the forces that govern competitive
equilibrium under adjustment. General intuition can be drawn from (8), which reduces to
the constant −

( )

f x*E
2t

in the no-adjustment, traditional Hotelling case (i.e., with i * j = 0 ).

The nature of the departure of (8) from that case can be seen to depend on the signed rate
at which marginal adjustment costs for each product change with the indifferent
consumer’s position xE* , moderated by the indifferent consumer’s adjustment
productivity with respect to the corresponding product. The expression makes evident
what we find in the formal result: greater adjustment intensity enables increased
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expression of price sensitivity effects that depend on how adjustment facility varies with
strength of initial product preference.
Consider Figure 3. The first panel of the figure shows a symmetric adjustment
map in which the curves grow steeper as as one moves from xE* toward positions of
stronger initial preference. The second panel shows a symmetric map in which the curves
at first grow flatter. In both cases, the curves must eventually become increasingly steep
as one approaches x = 0 or x = 1 ; this follows from Assumption 4. What is critical to our
result, however, is what happens near xE* . If the curves grow steeper with stronger initial
preference, a price increase for a product moves to the margin previously-inframarginal
consumers who find adjustment less productive at improving their attitude than the
consumer at xE* . These consumers, if they switched products, would forgo higher total
costs (i.e., transportation plus adjustment costs) from the product they left than would a
consumer with the same adjustment facility as the consumer at xE* . Given symmetry,
they would also incur lower total costs from their new product relative to a consumer
with the same adjustment facility as the consumer at xE* . Thus an adjustment map with
this particular shape sets up an increased incentive for switching, whence demand is more
price-sensitive, all else equal. The more intensively consumers engage in adjustment, the
more relative adjustment facility conditions consumers’ decisions, and so the stronger the
described effect.
< INSERT FIGURE 3 APPROXIMATELY HERE >
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Consider, on the other hand, what occurs when the adjustment map has the shape
displayed in the second panel of the figure. Then, a price increase moves to the margin
previously-inframarginal consumers who find adjustment more productive than the
consumer at xE* . These consumers, if they switched products, would forgo lower total
costs from the product they left than would a consumer with the same adjustment facility
as the consumer at xE* . Given symmetry, they would also incur higher total costs from
their new product relative to a consumer with the same adjustment facility as the
consumer at xE* . Thus demand is less price sensitive, all else equal, when the adjustment
map has this particular shape. As with the steepening map, the more intensively
consumers engage in adjustment, the stronger the described effect.
The implications of adjustment for price levels follow directly from Proposition 2,
in view of the price equations given in Proposition 1.

Proposition 3. Consider a symmetric case in adjustment. Adjustment decreases prices
when consumers’ adjustment facility diminishes with stronger initial product preference.
It increases prices when consumers’ adjustment facility increases with stronger initial
product preference.

As with Proposition 2, Proposition 3’s intuition has to do with switching. Because price
increases encourage more rapid switching when adjustment maps steepen, firms naturally
find it less profitable to increase prices under such circumstances. The opposite is true
when adjustment maps flatten toward the extremes. Adjustment intensity, which

15

conditions the relative size of the role adjustment costs play in consumers’ decisions,
determines the degree to which the variation of adjustment facility with strength of initial
preference influences firms’ decisions over price.
Note that the effects of adjustment behaviour on price sensitivity and price levels
that we have just derived offer quite a general result. They do not depend on the
distribution of consumers: the model has posited a general distribution function. They
depend only how the progression of marginal adjustment costs of consumers over the
adjustment process varies depending upon the relative strength of their initial preferences,
as represented by the shape of the adjustment map.
Finally, let us generalise to the adjustment case the classic Hotelling result on the
price effect of product differentiation:

Proposition 4 (Product differentiation). Consider a symmetric case with respect to the
two firms. (i) Prices increase with t. (ii) The effect of t on prices is less (greater) relative
to the no-adjustment case when consumers’ adjustment facility decreases (increases) with
stronger initial product preference. (iii) t intensifies the effects of adjustment on price.

An increment to t increases the market power of the firms directly, as in the classic
model; additionally it increases the importance of consumer adjustment, causing the price
effects of adjustment to be more pronounced. Thus, if adjustment curves become steeper
as one moves toward positions of extreme preference, an increase in product
differentiation causes prices to rise more slowly than they would in the no-adjustment
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case, due to the offsetting effects of the expressed adjustment. If adjustment curves
become flatter toward the extremes, an increase in product differentiation causes prices to
rise faster than they would in the no-adjustment case, for the same reason. In all cases the
sign of the effect of product differentiation on prices remains unambiguously positive.

4. IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY

4.1. Two adjustment regimes: regression to the mean and the halo effect

What do the patterns of marginal adjustment cost represented by the maps shown
in the two panels of Figure 3 signify in terms of real-world behaviour? When should one
expect adjustment behaviour to be characterised by pattern in the top panel, and when the
pattern in the bottom panel?
One may think of adjustment quite generally as drawing upon current experiences
and exposures to information, as well as the data from past exposures stored in memory,
as resources for attitude change (Crano and Prislin 2006). Consider first a simple case in
which individuals have no innate differences in attitudes or abilities to adjust, and in
which ability to adjust and exposure to information supportive to attitude are uncorrelated
with current attitude. In such a case an individual’s stronger (weaker) initial positive
attitude toward an object must accrue to having received prior positive (negative)
exposures in support of that attitude. How easy further adjustment will be for an
individual will depend on which exposures have already occurred – in essence, draws
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without replacement – versus which have not. Thus those individuals with a weak initial9
preference for an object should possess the greatest pool of not-previously-drawn positive
exposures, representing the greatest unexploited opportunities to adjust. Meanwhile,
those with the most intense initial preferences will have exhausted (i.e., drawn without
replacement) the most persuasive information and arguments available to foster
adjustment. It follows in this scenario that individuals with weaker initial preferences will
find adjustment less costly, while those with stronger initial preferences will find it more
costly. Consistent with the top panel of Figure 3, such an adjustment cost structure would
be characterised by attitudes tending to converge following adjustment. I refer to this as
the regression to the mean (RTTM) regime.
Now consider a case in which individuals may or may not exhibit innate
differences in attitude toward an object, but where the ability to adjust and/or exposure to
information supportive to attitude correlate with one’s currently having a strong positive
attitude. This would logically follow if, say, judgments or information availability in
memory are biased in the direction of one’s current attitude. In this case individuals
would find adjustment easier the stronger their initial preferences. Thus a strong positive
initial impression of an object would correlate with the building of yet a stronger positive
attitude, consistent with the bottom panel in Figure 3. A well-documented phenomenon
that epitomises this is the halo effect, according to which individuals infer unknown
qualities of an object based on their existing overall impressions.10
9

Since attitude change may quite generally be viewed as occurring dynamically over the whole life of the
individual, the term “initial” should be interpreted as relative to the point in time at which a consumer
decision is imminent, whence motivated decision-complementary adjustment would commence.
10
See, e.g., Nisbett and Wilson (1977).
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The characteristic that distinguishes RTTM adjustment from halo effect
adjustment is the scope of the information and persuasive arguments that individuals rely
upon under each. Specifically, the biasing that affects halo effect adjusters is tantamount
to a constraint on the scope of information relied upon. To see this intuitively, consider
that in Figure 3 it is possible to convert any set of symmetric adjustment maps based on
the bottom pattern to a set observing the top pattern simply by lowering the more extreme
portions of the inner adjustment curves and thereby reducing their slopes. Thus one may
think of the halo effect pattern, quite generally, as reflecting a failure of relatively
indifferent individuals to “see” opportunities for more facile adjustment that those who
already strongly prefer the object see. In effect, halo effect adjusters with initial weak
impressions exhibit a kind of myopia.
What observable factors can explain this tendency toward constrained information
sourcing? While others may be possible, I propose two accounts that point to answers to
this question. One possibility, supported by evidence from psychological research, is that
the halo effect adjusters are going with their initial impressions because their cognitive
resources are limited and it is simply easier to do so than to come up with new
information or arguments that go beyond those impressions.11 Another possibility is that
these individuals intrinsically prefer to draw information from their initial impressions.
This might occur if individuals have preferences not just over goods and services, but
over information sources for making judgments regarding goods and services. Such a
preference might induce an individual to rely on initial impressions heavily, even if doing
11

See Kahneman (2011), Chapter 7; and, for a classic application to how people assess others’
personalities, Asch (1946).
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so reduces his eventual consumption utility from the goods or services. The remainder of
this section considers some observable factors that explain halo effect adjustment
behaviour as a function either of individual cognitive resource limitations or intrinsic
preference for initial impressions.

4.2. Markets to the poor

Recent research suggests that the poor experience challenges not only because of
their limited financial resources, but also because of severely taxed resources of attention.
Overwhelmed by the need to address pressing demands presented by overdue bills,
unreliable child care, debts and the like, they find their attention compromised with
respect to anything that is not immediately pressing. Diverse studies find that
“bandwidth” constraints lead poor people to exhibit reduced fluid intelligence, working
memory, and executive control (Mullainathan and Shafir 2013). In the context of the
adjustment model, a bandwidth tax implies yet another challenge: those in poverty adjust
to products based on the halo effect pattern and therefore, all else equal, pay higher prices
than other people.
Bandwidth constraints imply that adjustment, which requires bandwidth, would
be a luxury for the poor. More important for our purposes, however, the pattern of
marginal adjustment costs faced by the poor is likely to be qualitatively altered by those
constraints. Consistent with their tendency to attend primarily to what is immediately in
front of them, it is reasonable to hypothesise that the poor would draw heavily on their
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own initial impressions, rather than diverse external resources, when adjusting.
Considering new persuasive arguments and new sources of information in support of a
product – in essence, “getting the big picture” – is beyond the wherewithal of someone
who is continually thinking about when her next paycheck is coming and how to allocate
it among various urgent needs. A poor individual who is relatively indifferent to a
product will, therefore, find it exceedingly hard to get more comfortable with that
product. Put another way, myopia with respect to the good qualities of an indifferent
object is particularly acute for those in poverty: it is hard, given taxed bandwidth, to see
what is so good about a thing you had not previously considered carefully.
Whether the poor pay more for equivalent items than other people has long been
debated in the literature. Conceptually there are factors that cut both ways. On the one
hand, the poor face limited access to low-price outlets within their own neighborhoods,
combined with mobility constraints that make it difficult for them to benefit from the
greater array of distribution options available in wealthier areas. (Eckholm 2006,
Fellowes 2006, Talukdar 2008.) On the other hand, financial scarcity motivates the poor
to be more parsimonious and devote more effort to economizing relative to other people
(Mullainathan and Shafir 2013, pp. 87-104). Additionally, a lower opportunity cost of
time may induce the poor to invest more hours in the search process (Talukdar 2008).
Evidence on the question is correspondingly mixed. Several studies indicate the poor pay
higher prices, mainly because they make a substantial portion of their purchases at
smaller, non-chain-based, higher-priced stores (Chung and Myers 1999, Prahalad and
Hammond 2002, Talukdar 2008). Meanwhile, Borda et al. (2009) find in an extensive
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study using Neilsen household-level data that, while the poor indeed make a substantial
portion of their purchases at convenience stores, they buy so much more at low-priced
superstores that they end up paying less on average. The authors of the study find,
moreover, that the poor pay less on average at the same outlets than other people, because
they are more likely to buy items on sale. Their findings corroborate the proposition that
the poor are more motivated to save and so are more parsimonious than other people.
Critically, the focal conversation in the existing literature has to do with search
and supply; that is, whether the poor’s benefits and costs of search, and their access to
low-priced goods, differ significantly on balance from everyone else’s. On this basis, if in
fact the poor pay more, it would be tempting to speculate that market forces, in time, will
bring down prices for those in poverty. To the extent that the poor have traditionally had
to abide high-priced convenience stores associated with so-called “food deserts” (i.e.,
neighborhoods bereft of supermarkets), inroads from superstores such as Wal-Mart
would be expected to narrow price disparities. Solutions based on new technologies, such
as online shopping and mobile apps that allow for store-to-store price comparisons
without the need to travel, would bring down search costs and help close the price gap.
But predictions such as these ignore the cognitive dimension of the problem the
poor face. The adjustment theory demonstrates that high search costs and sparse supply
are not the only disadvantages suffered by the poor in goods markets. Correspondingly,
innovations that have reduced search costs and improved supply over the past generation
and that continue to make improvements in these areas are not a panacea for those in
poverty.
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To eliminate the disadvantages of the poor, one must go to the heart of the
problem: their deficit of bandwidth. Many of the policy suggestions advanced by
Mullainathan and Shafir (2013) aimed at clearing bandwidth for the poor could help
improve their plight in goods markets. Note that, per the discussion above, the bandwidth
deficit poses a problem for the poor not because of its direct effect on the decision
processing capabilities of the individual consumer. Rather it is for the counterintuitive
reason that this deficit influences the way in which adjustment capabilities are distributed
across the mass of consumers based on relative strength of preference. This bears
emphasis, because it is normal for one to think of prices being kept low by the vigilance
and good judgment of individual consumers. Corresponding to the ecological nature of
the problem, the benefits of bandwidth-clearing policies flow from a beneficial change to
the distribution of relative adjustment capabilities rather than – as would seem most
intuitive – from impacts on the quality of individual decisions.

4.3. Other constrained individuals

The poor are not the only group characterised by the sort of cognitive tax that
results in halo effect adjustment. Anyone whose cognitive resources are severely taxed
should experience the adjustment myopia hypothesised. People under substantial stress,
for example, will tend to “tunnel,” paying attention only to immediately pressing matters
and ignoring opportunities for gain that are not immediately in front of them. People who
are extremely busy, or who are highly focused on other forms of scarcity, such as
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loneliness, may behave similarly.12 When markets are dominated by such individuals, the
predicted price and price sensitivity effects corresponding to halo effect adjustment
should appear. The greater the proportion of taxed individuals present in the market, the
stronger the effects.

4.4. Markets to the less educated

The adjustment theory also admits the provocative conclusion that personality
affects market outcomes. Openness to experience, one of the dimensions in the FiveFactor Model of personality, characterises individuals who exhibit an intrinsic interest in
a variety of experiences and a “fluid style of consciousness” (McRae 2004). An
individual with this personality type would be unusually capable at getting comfortable
with objects with respect to which he had not previously formed a strong positive
impression (e.g., new or previously untried products). The implication is that a market
dominated by individuals rating highly on openness to experience should be epitomised
by the RTTM adjustment pattern and should tend to have lower prices. Meanwhile, a
market largely consisting of people less open to experience might tend toward the halo
effect pattern and have higher prices.
The degree of openness may explain price patterns typically attributed to other
factors. As a trait that has been related to intelligence and knowledge (Wiggins 1996), its
absence may explain the higher prices often paid by less educated individuals (e.g.,
12

For an extensive taxonomy of groups that exhibit intense cognitive scarcity, see Mullainathan and Shafir
(2013).
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Hausman and Sidak 2004). The traditional explanation of why the less educated pay more
has focused on lack of facility with search: those with fewer years of schooling find
information processing more challenging and so should be expected to have a harder time
getting the best product deals (Schmidt and Spreng 1996). But a policy based on the logic
of search costs, such as training in consumer skills, would fail to address the personality
effect. That is, the less educated, even when trained thus, would likely remain more
dogmatic and less tolerant of ambiguity, hence less receptive to new things (McRae
2004). Markets dominated by the less educated accordingly could exhibit persistently
high prices even when individuals are treated with targeted consumer education.
Increasing competition has been proposed as an alternative way of addressing the
high prices paid by the less educated (Hausman and Sidak 2004). In the adjustment
model, increased competition manifests as lower transportation costs, which lead to lower
prices. Proposition 4 indicates that markets exhibiting the halo effect pattern are more
sensitive to variation in transportation costs, all else equal. There is reason, therefore, to
believe that increased competition would indeed be an effective remedy for markets
dominated by less educated individuals.

5. CONCLUSION

This paper has presented a new theory of differentiated product markets in which
attitude adjustment complements consumer choice. I have laid out a model whose core
construct – the adjustment map – provides a general setup for analysing how differences
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in the distribution of adjustment capabilities across consumers endowed with different
initial preferences lead to different market outcomes. The theory provides specific
predictions for markets dominated by poor consumers, other cognitively taxed
consumers, and less educated consumers. These cases offer but a few illustrations of the
competitive market effects that follow from this behavioural phenomenon. The economic
relevance of adjustment goes beyond its effects on prices in a competitive market to areas
yet to be considered.
The process of understanding the implications of consumer adjustment has thus
only been initiated, and there are a number of useful directions for further research. Let
me suggest two in closing. Taking the theory to data either in the lab or by an appropriate
field experiment could offer a proof of concept and allow measurement of the model’s
predicted effects. An ideal study would quantify the size of effects predicted on the basis
of adjustment relative to factors traditionally recognised as affecting price levels. The
role of product differentiation as a mediating factor could be explicitly examined.
Additionally, the recognition that complementary adjustment is an element of the
consumer decision process naturally motivates a re-examination of the role of
advertising. Several studies suggest that it may be appropriate to think of advertising as
facilitating consumer self-persuasion.13 Within the adjustment theory’s framework,
advertising might be contextualised as reducing – and, more generally, restructuring – the

13

See Ehrlich et al. (1957) and Mills (1965) for evidence of consumers’ use of advertising to reduce the
cognitive dissonance experienced following a purchase. The motivated use of advertising by consumers is
discussed conceptually in the uses and gratifications literature: see O’Donohoe (1994), Ko et al. (2005),
Aitken et al. (2008), and Phillips and McQuarrie (2010).
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costs of adjustment. By means of the framework, a future analysis might effectively take
a fresh look at advertising’s effects on competitive market equilibrium and welfare.

APPENDIX

A. APPLICABILITY OF LOG CONCAVITY OF F (.) IN p j
In this section, I show that log concavity of F (.) in p0 – a critical condition for
the existence of an interior equilibrium in prices – may be met (1) for the general class of
symmetric adjustment map pairs for any symmetric distribution f, and (2) for an example
of a non-symmetric adjustment map pair when f is Beta distributed with shape parameters

(α , β ) = ( 3, 3) . The main issue in the case of non-symmetric map pairs is that,
approaching the extreme locations x = 0 and x = 1 , consumers’ marginal adjustment
costs approach infinity for the nearby product. Thus, unless marginal adjustment costs for
the distant product similarly grow without limit, sensitivity of demand to price rises
precipitously at the extremes, making it potentially profitable for firms to attempt to drop
price from any candidate interior maximum to a low enough level to take the whole
market. This situation is avoided if the density of consumers at the extremes is
sufficiently low, as with some log-concave distributions such as the Beta. So, to
summarise, an interior price equilibrium will result whenever the incentive to de-stabilise
such an equilibrium is mitigated by adjustment symmetry; or when there are not enough
consumers with extreme tastes for firms to want to de-stabilize an interior price
equilibrium despite non-symmetry.
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( )

We may define the log concavity of F (.) in p0 as f xE*

( ) f (x )

decreasing in p0 or, equivalently, −F xE*

*
E

∂ x*E
∂ p0

∂ x*E
∂ p0

F ( xE* ) being

decreasing in p0 . This gives rise to

the following necessary and sufficient condition:
∂2 x*E
∂ p02

(A1)

( )
∂ x*E
∂ p0

2

<

f ( xE* )

F ( xE* )

−

f ' ( xE* )
f ( xE* )

Using (7),
−2

i*1( x*E )
i*0 ( x*E )
⎡
⎤
1
∂ 2 xE*
dg
dg 0 ⎥
⎢
=
−
−2t
+
di
−
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∫0 dxE*
∫0 dxE* ⎥ ⋅
∂ p02
⎢
⎣
⎦
i*0 ( x*E )
⎡ i*1( x*E ) 2 1 *
⎤
d
g
∂x
d 2 g 0 ∂xE*
dg1 *1 ∂xE* dg 0 *0 ∂xE* ⎥
E
⎢
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di + * ix
−
ix
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dxE*2 ∂ p0
dxE ∂ p0 dxE*
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⎢ ∫0 dxE ∂ p0
0
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i*0 ( x*E )
2 i*1( x*E ) 2 1
⎤
*
⎛ ∂xE* ⎞ ⎡
d
g
∂x
d 2 g 0 ∂xE*
dg1 *1 ∂xE* dg 0 *0 ∂xE* ⎥
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⎢
= −⎜
di
−
di
+
i
−
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∫0 dxE*2 ∂ p0 dxE* x ∂ p0 dxE* x ∂ p0 ⎥
⎝ ∂ p0 ⎟⎠ ⎢ ∫0 dxE*2 ∂ p0
⎣
⎦

whence (A1) may be re-written
i*0 ( x*E )
⎡ i*1( x*E ) 2 1
⎤ f ( x* ) f '( x* )
2 0
1
0
d
g
d
g
dg
dg
E
E
*1
*0
− ∂ p0 ⎢ ∫
di − ∫
di + * ix − * ix ⎥ <
−
*2
*2
*
*
dx
dx
dx
dx
⎢ 0
⎥ F ( xE ) f ( xE )
E
E
E
E
0
⎣
⎦
∂ x*E

(A2)

where

∂ x*E
∂ p0

, which is not a function of i, has been pulled out of the integrals.

Consider first the set of pairs of symmetric adjustment maps, {G 0 , G
adjustment curve in G

0

1

} . For each

corresponding to a given location x ∈( 0,1) , the corresponding

curve in G 1 would be its mirror image about x. An example of a subset of such pairs, for

j = 0,1 and ρ ∈[ −1,1] , is given by
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for x ∈[ 0, 14 ]

x
⎧ 2( x−i
)
⎪ ρx
1− ρ
⎪⎪ 2( x−i ) + 2−8i
j
g = ⎨ ρ(1−x ) 1− ρ
⎪ 2(1−x−i ) + 2−8i
⎪ 1−x
⎪⎩ 2(1−x−i )

(A3)

for x ∈[ 14 , 12 ]
for x ∈[ 12 , 43 ]
for x ∈[ 43 ,1]

Map pairs corresponding to the values ρ = 1 and ρ = −1 are shown in Figure 4.
<INSERT FIGURE 4 APPROXIMATELY HERE>
With symmetric adjustment map pairs, and symmetric distribution f, the following
conditions hold: (i)

dg 0
dx*E

=

dg1
dx*E

, (ii)

d 2 g0
dx*2
E

=

d 2 g1
dx*2
E

, (iii) i *0 = i *1 , (iv) ix*0 = ix*1 , and (v)

f ' ( xE* ) = 0 . It may be verified, based on these, that the necessary and sufficient condition
(A2) above for log concavity is met, whence log concavity of F ( x ( p0 )) holds for any
symmetric distribution f.
Consider now an example of a non-symmetric adjustment map pair, given by

g 0 ( i, x ) ≡ x 2 ( x − i ) and g1 ( i, x ) ≡ (1− x ) 2 (1− x − i ) for x ∈[ 0,1] . These functions have
the property that g 0 ( 0, x ) = g1 ( 0, x ) = 1 2 . Observe further that i *0 ( x,t ) =
for t ≥ 12 , whence i * < x ; similarly i *1 ( x,t ) =

ix*0 =

2t−1
2t

2t−1
2t

2t−1
2t

x is defined

(1− x ) , whence i* < 1− x . We also have

and ix*1 = − 2t−1
2t . We evaluate the left-hand side of (A2) at i = 0 (i.e., the position

at which the indifferent consumer evaluates his decision between product options) for all

x ∈[ 0,1] , using integration by parts:
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( )

i*1 x*E

∫
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∫
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(A4)
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∫
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i
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Substituting into (7) for our example functions we obtain

∂ x*E
∂ p0

= −1 (1− ln 2t1 ) , whence we

may re-write the left-hand side of (A2) as

(A5)

i*0 ( x*E )
2
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⎢ 0 dxE
⎣
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∂ x*E

Now assume f is distributed Beta with shape parameters (α , β ) = ( 3, 3) . We have:
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x

f ( x) =

1

⎡⎣ x (1− x ) ⎤⎦

∫ ⎡⎣u (1− u )⎤⎦
0

⇒ f '( x ) =
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Thus,

f ' ( xE* )
f ( xE* )

−

f ( xE* )

F ( xE* )

=

2x (1− x ) (1− 2x )

(A6)

⎡⎣ x (1− x ) ⎤⎦

2

−

x

⎡⎣ x (1− x ) ⎤⎦

∫ ⎡⎣u (1− u )⎤⎦

2

2

du

0

2 (1− 2x )
30 [1− x ]
=
−
x (1− x ) x ⎡⎣ 6x 2 − 15x + 10 ⎤⎦
2

One may verify using (A5) and (A6) that (A2) holds for all x ∈( 0,1) , and for any t > 12 .

B. PROOFS AND DERIVATIONS OF LEMMAS, PROPOSITIONS, AND REMARKS

(

)

Derivation of Lemma 1. Beginning with the expression g j i * j ( x,t,θ ) ,θ , x = t which
implicitly defines i * j , and totally differentiating (here, for j = 0 ),
gi0*0 di *0 = −gx0 dx − gθ0 dθ + dt ⇔ gi0*0 di *0 = −gx0 dx − dθ + dt

Using Cramer’s rule, it follows from Assumption 3 that

ix*0 ( x, A0 ) = −

0
gx0 gi*0
<
=1
gi0*0 gi0*0

Also using Cramer’s rule one obtains
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it*0 ( x, A0 r,t ) = 1 gi0*0 > 0 and iθ*0 = −

gθ0
1
=− 0 <0
0
gi*0
gi*0

Corresponding results can be derived along the same lines for j = 1 .

Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is an extension of the proof of Bloch and Manceau’s
(1999) Lemma 1. Suppose that the market is not covered, that is, at equilibrium prices

( p , p ) there exists a consumer x for whom
*
0

*
1

V − p0* − t ⎡⎣ x − i *0 ( x ) ⎤⎦ −

i*0 ( x )

∫

g 0 ( i, x ) di < 0

and

0

V − p − t ⎡⎣1− x − i
*
1

i*1( x )

*1

( x )⎤⎦ − ∫

g1 ( i, x ) di < 0

0

One can show these prices do not constitute a Nash equilibrium, in that firm 0 can
increase its profit by lowering its price p0 without altering the profit, hence strategy, of

(

)

firm 1. Begin by noting that, under p0* , p1* , because there is a consumer for whom
neither good provides nonnegative utility somewhere between the firms, the profit of firm
0 can be written
i*0 ( x0 )
⎧⎪
⎫⎪
*0
Π 0 = p ( x0 ) F ( x0 ) ≡ ⎨V − t ⎡⎣ x0 − i ( x0 ) ⎤⎦ − ∫ g 0 ( i, x0 ) di ⎬ F ( x0 )
0
⎪⎩
⎪⎭
*
0

(

)

where x0 is the position of the consumer who, at prices p0* , p1* , is just indifferent
between buying product 0 and buying nothing. By assumption, ∂Π 0 ∂x0 > 0 . Now note
that
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∂ p0 ∂x0 = −t + ti − g ( i , x0 ) i x −
*0
x

0
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i*0 ( x0 )
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0
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= −t + g ( i
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∫
0
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0

dg
di
di

( x0 ), x0 ) − g ( 0, x0 ) = −g ( 0, x0 ) < 0

which follows from Assumption 3. Since ∂Π 0 ∂x0 = ( ∂Π 0 ∂ p0 ) ( ∂ p0 ∂x0 ) , it follows
that ∂Π 0 ∂ p0 < 0 . Therefore a small downward deviation in the price p0 from p0*
increases firm 0’s profits while not affecting firm 1’s profits. This contradicts the

(

)

assertion that p0* , p1* constitute an equilibrium.

Proof of Proposition 2. Differentiating (8) with respect to θ yields
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In the symmetric case,

∂ x*E
∂θ

= 0 ; therefore

∂2 g 0
∂ x*E ∂θ

to
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=

∂2 g1
∂ x*E ∂θ

= 0 , and we can simplify the above
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We signed iθ*00 negative in Lemma 1; this means that

∂ 2 D0
dg1 dg 0
takes the sign of * − *
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, thus the effect of adjustment on price sensitivity of demand takes this sign.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Using p0* = − F xE*
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Proof of Proposition 4. Begin with the expression for p0 in Proposition 1,

p0* = − F ( xE* ) f ( xE* ) ∂∂ xpE0 . Because ∂∂txE = 0 in the symmetric case, it follows that
*

*

( ) f ( x ) is invariant in t. So, using Lemma 1 and

F xE*

*
E
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∂g1
∂ x*E

*
E

1
i*1

∂g 0
∂ x*E

0
i*0

Given Assumption 3, this may be signed positive. The no-adjustment case yields

∂ p0 ∂t = 2 F ( x ) f ( x ) , consistent with Bloch and Manceau (1999). Clearly
∂ p0 ∂t > 2 F ( x ) f ( x ) corresponds to
when

∂g 0
∂ x*E

< 0 and

∂g1
∂ x*E

∂g 0
∂ x*E

> 0 and

∂g1
∂ x*E

< 0 , while ∂ p0 ∂t < 2 F ( x ) f ( x )

> 0.

Finally, given that (A7) neatly decomposes into a direct effect of product
differentiation without adjustment and an indirect effect through adjustment, the signing
relationships given above indicate that t positively mediates the effects of adjustment on
price. That is, the larger t, the more intense the effects of adjustment on price.

REFERENCES
Aitken, Robert, Brendan Gray, and Robert Lawson, “Advertising Effectiveness from a
Consumer Perspective,” International Journal of Advertising, 27 (2008), 279-297.
Ariely, Dan, and Michael I. Norton, “How Actions Create – Not Just Reveal –
Preferences,” Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12 (2008), 13-16.
Asch, S. E., “Forming Impressions of Personality,” Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 41 (1946), 258-290.
Bénabou, Roland, and Jean Tirole, “Willpower and Personal Rules,” Journal of Political
Economy, 112 (2004), 848-886.

35

______, “Identity, Morals, and Taboos: Beliefs As Assets,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 126 (2011), 805-855.
Bloch, Francis, and Delphine Manceau, “Persuasive Advertising in Hotelling’s Model of
Product Differentiation,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 17
(1999), 557-574.
Bodner, Ronit, and Drazen Prelec, “Self-signaling and Diagnostic Utility in Everyday
Decision Making,” in The Psychology of Economic Decisions. 1: Rationality and
Well-being, I. Brocas and J. D. Carrillo, eds. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2003).
Broda, Christian, Ephraim Leibtag, and David E. Weinstein, “The Role of Prices in
Measuring the Poor’s Living Standards,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 23
(2009), 77-97.
Caplin, Andrew, and Barry Nalebuff, “Aggregation and Imperfect Competition: On the
Existence of Equilibrium,” Econometrica, 59 (1991), 25-59.
Chung, Chanjin, and Samuel L. Myers, Jr., “Do the Poor Pay More for Food? An
Analysis of Grocery Store Availability and Food Price Disparities,” Journal of
Consumer Affairs, 33 (1999), 276-296.
Crano, William D., and Radmila Prislin, “Attitudes and Persuasion,” Annual Review of
Psychology, 57 (2006), 345-374.
Dal Bó, Ernesto, and Marko Terviö, “Self-Esteem, Moral Capital, and Wrongdoing,”
Journal of the European Economic Association, 11 (2013), 599-633.
Eckholm, Erik, “Study Documents ‘Ghetto Tax’ Being Paid by the Urban Poor,” New
York Times, 19 July (2006), B11.
Ehrlich, Danuta, Isaiah Guttman, and Peter Schönbach, “Postdecision Exposure to
Relevant Information,” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 54 (1957),
98-102.
Fellowes, Matthew, “The High Price of Being Poor,” Los Angeles Times, 23 July (2006),
A14.
Festinger, Leon. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson, 1957.
Hausman, Jerry A., and J. Gregory Sidak, “Why Do the Poor and the Less-Educated Pay
More for Long Distance Calls?” Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy, 3
(2004).

36

Hotelling, Harold, “Stability in Competition,” Economic Journal, 39 (1929), 41-57.
Izuma, Keise, and Ralph Adolphs, “Social Manipulation of Preference in the Human
Brain,” Neuron, 78 (2013), 563-573.
Izuma, Keise, Madoka Matsumoto, Kou Murayama, Kazuyuki Samejima, Norihiro
Sadato, and Kenji Matsumoto, “Neural Correlates of Cognitive Dissonance and
Choice-Induced Preference Change,” Proceedings of the Natural Academy of
Sciences of the United States of America, 107 (2010), 22014-22019.
Jarcho, Johanna M., Elliot T. Berkman, and Matthew D. Lieberman, “The Neural Basis
of Rationalization: Cognitive Dissonance Reduction During Decision-Making,”
Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 6 (2011), 460-467.
Kahneman, Daniel. Thinking Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2011.
Kitayama, Shinobu, Hannah Faye Chua, Steven Tompson, and Shihui Han, “Neural
Mechanisms of Dissonance: An fMRI Investigation of Choice Justification,”
NeuroImage, 69 (2013), 206-212.
Kitayama, Shinobu, Alana Conner Snibe, Hazel Rose Markus, and Tomoko Suzuki, “Is
There Any ‘Free’ Choice? Self and Dissonance in Two Cultures,” Psychological
Science, 15 (2004), 527-533.
Ko, Hanjun, Chang-Hoan Cho, and Marilyn S. Roberts, “Internet Uses and Gratifications:
A Structural Equation Model of Interactive Advertising,” Journal of Advertising,
34 (2005), 57-70.
Kőszegi, Botond, and Matthew Rabin, “A Model of Reference-Dependent Preferences,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121 (2006), 1133-1165.
McRae, Tobert R., “Openness to Experience,” in Encyclopedia of Applied Psychology,
Volume 2, Charles Spielberger, ed. (Cambridge, MA: Elsevier Academic Press,
2004)
Mills, Judson, “Avoidance of Dissonant Information,” Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 2 (1965), 589-593.
Mullainathan, Sendhil, and Eldar Shafir. Scarcity: The New Science of Having Less and
How It Defines Our Lives. New York: Picador, 2013.
O’Donohoe, Stephanie, “Advertising Uses and Gratifications,” European Journal of
Marketing, 28 (1994), 52-75.

37

Phillips, Barbara J., and Edward F. McQuarrie, “Narrative and Persuasion in Fashion
Advertising,” Journal of Consumer Research, 37 (2010), 368-392.
Prahalad, Coimbatore K., and Allen Hammond, “Serving the World’s Poor, Profitably,”
Harvard Business Review, 80 (2002), 48-59.
Qin, Jungang, Sasha Kimel, Shinobu Kitayama, Xiaoying Wang, Xuedong Yang, and
Shuhui Han, “How Choice Modifies Preference: Neural Correlates of Choice
Justification,” NeuroImage, 55 (2011), 240-246.
Schmidt, Jeffrey B., and Richard A. Spreng, “A Proposed Model of External Consumer
Search,” Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 24 (1996), 246-256.
Sharot, Tali, Benedetto De Martino, and Raymond J. Dolan, “How Choice Reveals and
Shapes Expected Hedonic Outcome,” Journal of Neuroscience, 29 (2009), 37603765.
Sharot, Tali, Cristina M. Velasquez, and Raymond J. Dolan, “Do Decisions Shape
Preference? Evidence from Blind Choice,” Psychological Science, 21 (2010),
1231-1235.
Talukdar, Debabrata, “Cost of Being Poor: Retail Price and Consumer Price Search
Differences Across Inner-City and Suburban Neighborhoods,” Journal of
Consumer Research, 35 (2008), 457-471.
Thaler, Richard, “Mental Acounting and Consumer Chocie,” Marketing Science, 4
(1985), 199-214.
van Veen, Vincent, Marie K. Krug, Jonathan L. Schooler, and Cameron S. Carter,
“Neural Activity Predicts Attitude Change in Cognitive Dissonance,” Nature
Neuroscience, 12 (2009), 1469-1475.
Wakslak, Cheryl J., “The Experience of Cognitive Dissonance in Important and Trivial
Domains: A Construal-Level Theory Approach,” Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 48 (2012), 1361-1364.
Wiggins, Jerry S. The Five-Factor Model of Personality: Theoretical Perspectives. New
York: Guilford Press, 1996.

38

g0(x ,i)

i
0

x

1/2
Figure 1
An Adjustment Map

1

g0(x ,i)

g1( x,i)
i*0( x )

i*1( x )

t

()

i *0 x

∫ ( )

t(x - i*0)
Transporta1on Cost

0

0

g0 i,x di

0

Adjustment
Cost

x

Figure 2
Components of U=lity Loss from Selec=ng Non-ideal Product 0

1

0

xE *

1

0

xE *

1

Figure 3
Steepening vs. Fla2ening Adjustment Maps

ρ=1

0

1

1/2

ρ=-1

0

1/2
Figure 4
Symmetric Adjustment Map Pairs

1

